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The Yale Law Journal
Volume 82, Number 7, June 1973

Constitutional Adjudication:
The Who and When
Henry P. Monaghan*
When the newly appointed Justices of the Supreme Court assembled
in the Royal Exchange Building in New York for their first session on
February 2, 1790,1 the most farsighted individual could not have foreseen what the future held for this tribunal. Now less than a generation
short of its 200th anniversary, the Court is universally acknowledged
2
to be the final and authoritative expositor of the Constitution. Yet
after almost two centuries, questions concerning this power of the Court
to interpret the Constitution remain. The first set of questions centers
on the substantive standards for constitutional adjudication. 3 The second, with which this article deals, focuses on the conditions under
0

Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
1. C. WARREN, THE SUPRE-ME COURT IN UNrrzE STATES Hisrony 4647 (1928).
2. Indeed, the Court itself has gone so far as to advance the doubtful proposition
that its interpretations of the Constitution are part of the Constitution itself. See
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958). Gf. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution,
65 COLUm. L. REv. 1001, 1008 (1965). This is not to den) that Congress has an important
role in constitutional determinations, but that role does not include definition of the
substantive standards. See Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations,
40 U. CINN. L. REv. 199, 233-34 (1970). Cf. D. MORGAN, CoNGREzss AND THE Co.sTrrmzo.N
(1966).
3. Some would dismiss this issue entirely by arguing that judges are simply robed leilators who do and should "represent" either "'alues," e.g., speech, equality, or *znterests," e.g., minorities." See, e.g., Wright, Professor Bichel, The Scholarly Tradition
and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L. REv. 769 (1971). "Those who accept this view,"
observes Professor Wechsler, "draw no distinction between politics and law, and urge
the [C]ourt to function simply as a power organ." Wechsler, supra note 2. at 1009.10.
There are numerous difficulties with this "political" view, not the least of which is
that no justification is advanced why the other brandies of government should feel
bound by the Court's avowedly political judgments. See generally Deutsch, Neutrality,
Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Politics, 20
STAN. L. REv. 169 (1968); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YA.E U.
227 (1972).
The Court itself has never overtly subscribed to such a view of its functions. apparently recognizing that public acceptance of judicial review depends in no small
measure on a widely shared and deeply felt belief that the Justices themselves are lions
under the throne. It is "of the essence of constitutionalism," writes Professor Kurland,
"that all government-not excepting the courts-is to be contained by established principles." P. KURLA'D, POLInCS, THE CoNs-rrno' AND THE WVARn. COURT 8 (1970). Supported by the great weight of professional opinion, the members of the Court. with
perhaps some rare exceptions, have viewed the judicial office as restricting them to a
reasoned elaboration of fundamental principles. See A. BicrEL, THE LEAsr D.ANGEnOUS
BRANCH 23-28 (1962); A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 222-23 (1968).
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which constitutional determinations should be made: who may obtain
constitutional declarations and when. Although often viewed as merely
technical, legalistic wrangling which unnecessarily impedes the Court
in its task of constitutional exegesis, these "who" and "when" questions
embody fundamental assumptions as to the Court's appropriate role
in our constitutional scheme.
The constitutional text is itself spare and unhelpful on these critical
questions, providing only that "the judicial power of the United States"
shall extend to certain enumerated "cases and controversies," including
those "arising under the Constitution. ' 4 Except for the creation of the
Court and limited specifications as to its original jurisdiction; the remainder was left to Congress, which was expressly authorized to establish such inferior federal courts as it saw fit and to regulate the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 5 At its first session Congress
quickly enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789,0 which authorized, inter
alia, Supreme Court review of certain constitutional determinations
by the state courts. While the Act also established lower federal courts
-a step which proved to have lasting significance-it gave those courts
no direct "arising under" jurisdiction, and accordingly, until the great
expansion of federal jurisdiction following the Civil War," their constitutional adjudications resulted only as by-products of the exercise
of other jurisdiction.8
Neither the Constitution nor the Act set out the circumstances under
which constitutional pronouncements were proper. Article III's "limitation" of the "judicial power" to "cases and controversies" has little
necessary meaning; like most provisions of the Constitution, these
words bear several interpretations. And while the Act established the
federal judicial system, it said little about the occasions on which it was
proper for any court to decide constitutional questions. Rather, like the
substantive constitutional standards, the nature and form of judicial review were slowly shaped over time.0
4. U.S. CONsT. art. III, §§ 1 & 2.
5. Id. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 12.13
n.46 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER], rejecting the view that Congress
was under a duty to establish lower federal courts possessing full judicial power. The
Court agrees. See Palmore v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 1670, 1678 (1973).
6. 1 STAT. 73. The classic account of the Act is contained in F. FRANKFURTER & J.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
ruaTER & LANDIS].

15-25 (1928) [hereinafter cited as

FRANK-

7. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-43 (1971); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241,

245-48 (1967).
8. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 1670, 1678 (1973).
9. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 57
(1955). The fact that § 25 of the Act of 1789 authorized review of certain state court
determinations plainly did not mean that it purported to consider all aspects of the
"who" and "when" questions.
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I.
A.

Two Models of Judicial Competence
The PrivateRights Model

Marbury v. Madison' o was the crucible for the development of both
"who" and "when" principles. In important part, Marbury found the
power of constitutional exposition to be an incident of the Court's obligation to decide the particular "case or controversy" before it."1 Thus,
constitutional litigation was viewed as essentially no different from any
other adjudication. That the Constitution was to be applied as "ordinary law" by the courts in resolving claims of litigants was a marked
advance, squarely rejecting as it did the view that the document stated
only political rules beyond the cognizance of judicial tribunals. 2- But
even that step forward does not exhaust Marbury'ssignificance, for the
case is now taken to have established that the Court's constitutional
interpretations are final and authoritative-that is, that they prevail
over those of every other organ of government.' 3
The assertion of this power to annul congressional and state legislation was, of course, heady and frightening stuff for any tribunal, particularly where opposition to the exercise of that power was frequent,
loud, and intense. Not unexpectedly, the Court over the course of time
developed a flexible range of doctrines, e.g., ripeness, mootness, standing, political question, abstention, exhaustion of remedies, which provided vehicles for avoiding constitutional questions.' 4 In part, these
10. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally Van Astyne, A Critical Guide to
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuE L.J. 1 (1969).
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37. 52
(1971).
12. See Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review, in 1 SELECrED ESSAYS ON CONsrrrTUnON Lw 128, 146-47 (1938).
13. Marbury decided that the Court could decide constitutional issues in cases coming before it. It did not decide who, apart from the litigants, must )ield to its interpretation. Rather, the Court's authoritative role is the end-product of the struggle. See
generally HART & WECHSLEi, supra note 5, at 455.
Another, and often overlooked, factor served to retard development of the Court's
authoritative status: Until well into the twentieth century, the Court's consideration
of constitutional cases was essentially episodic. Not only was the bulk of the Court's
docket comprised of other matters, but the accidents of litigation also determined the
range and character of the constitutional issues which reached it. By reducing the possibilities for the development of a systematic, coherent body of constitutional law, this
state of affairs rendered less than self-evident any claim by the Court to authoritative
status. See IV. CROSSETy, 2 POLITICS AND THE CoNsrruTioN IN TilE HWIORY OF TatE
UNrran STATES 978-80 (953). So unpredictable were the occasions on which the Court
would be called on to expound on the meaning of the Constitution that in 1893, Judge
Thayer asserted that the Court could rightly make a declaration of invalidity only
where the legislature had committed a "clear mistake." Thayer, The Origin and Scope
of The American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HI v. L. REV. 129. 143-44 (1893).
14. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See also Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947). For a provocative analysis
of the content and utility of these "ordinances of self-denial," compare A. BIcHEL, TIlE
LEAST D.NGEROUS BRANCH (1962) with Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive I'ir-
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doctrines reflected a strong ambivalance about the propriety of judicial
review in a democratic society, which, in turn, imported that judicial
intervention should occur only when unavoidably necessary and under
carefully structured circumstances designed to avoid "erroneous" holdings; 15 in part, they also reflected an intuition that frequent judicial
intervention in the political process would generate such widespread
political reaction that the Court would be destroyed in its wake.10
Looking back over time, these judicially fashioned rules served still
another very important function: They allowed the current dimensions of judicial review to become established at an acceptable political
pace.
These limiting doctrines shared, by and large, a coherent view of the
judicial process. In Marbury, Justice Marshall repeatedly emphasized
the necessity for the judicial protection of "vested" or "legal" rights;
and he declared that the "province of the Court is solely to decide on
the rights of individuals, . . ."17 Moreover, Marbury's analogy of constitutional litigation to "ordinary" common law litigation strongly suggested that the occasions for judicial review were limited to the protection of identifiable and concrete personal rights, similar to those
protected by the common law courts.' This view of the judicial function took deep roots, particularly as the nineteenth century wore on.0
And the Court, while quick to protect private rights from "arbitrary"
social legislation, repeatedly disclaimed any general commission to expound on the meaning of the Constitution.2 0 Professor Wechsler retues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review 64 COLUm. L. RE.v
1 (1964). On the question of whether the "case or controversy" and allied doctrines
must be as principled in their content as the substantive constitutional doctrines themselves, I stand squarely with Professor Gunther.
15. This view of judicial review had its intellectual origins in Thayer, supra note 13.
16. See, e.g., Bernard, Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in the United States Supreme Court: Liberties of the First Amendment, 50 MicH. L. REV. 261, 262.64 (1951).
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. Marbury repeatedly refers to the need for judicial en.A'ER5
forcement of "vested" or "legal rights." Id. at 162-64, 167. See also 78 FEDERALIST

12-24 (Cooke ed. 1959) defending judicial enforcement of constitutional limitations because, "Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount
to nothing." See also J. STORY,
STATES §. 1574, 1641 (1858).

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF 111C UNIII

18. My own view is that, prior to their recent judicial expansion, the substantive
constitutional guarantees could be viewed largely as securing against the government
the same rights which the common law of tort and property secured against private
individuals. Today, we have a somewhat reverse phenomenon: There is much concern
with imposing on "private" groups the expanded conceptions of rights now possessed
by the individual against the government. See, e.g., W. GatnouN, AMERICAN Rirrs
169-95 (1960).
19. Judicial concern for "vested rights" became a central part of the then-fashionable
theology of property. For an excellent review of the relevant social and judicial history
see W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSrITUTION IN THE 20-ni CENTURY: TlE OLD LEGALITY
1889-1932 (1969).
20. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346 (1911); California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R., 149 US. 308 (1893); Liverpool,
N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Educ., 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
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flected this tradition when, writing in 1966, he denied that the Court
had any "special function" of "policing or advising Legislatures or
Executives," and yet reasoneil that where individual rights were at
issue, the Court had the inescapable duty "to decide the litigated case
and to decide it in accordance with the [Constitution]."2 1
Frothinghamv. Mellon2= represents the classic judicial expression of
the "private rights" model. Mrs. Frothingham's interest qua taxpayer
in the expenditure of general federal funds, it will be remembered,
bore no resemblance to the kinds of concrete personal interests in liberty or property protected by the common law courts.23 A unanimous
Court expressly disclaimed any "power per se to review and annul acts
of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional." 2 4 "That
question," Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote, "may be considered only
when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened is
made to rest upon such an act."2 5 Frothingham thus followed in apostolic succession from Marbury's analogy of constitutional litigation to
"ordinary" common law suits, and it reflected a premise which underlay much of the thinking about standing, ripeness, and sovereign immunity.
The requirement that the plaintiffs assert concrete "private rights"
was nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in the Court's attitude
toward suits brought by states. It now seems extraordinary that the
question of whether an act of Congress exceeds the powers conferred
on it and thereby invades the rights reserved to the states could be litigated in suits between private parties without appropriate federal or
state officials being notified,20 but such was the case until this century. 27 Still more extraordinary was the consistent rejection of federalism claims when raised by the states themselves. During the Reconstruction courts repeatedly rejected attempts by the Southern states to challenge the validity of congressional legislation, because they presented
21. H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, PoLIncs, AND FUNDAMENTAL

-I.w

9 (1951).

22. 262 US. 447 (1923).
23. Not only did the suit not purport to determine Mrs. Frothingham's tax liabilities,
there was no reason to believe that victory would have reduced her tax bill. See
generally Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The N on.Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1034 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe,
The Cdtizen as Litigant].
24. 262 U.S. at 488.
25. Id. Frothingham rested squarely on the premise that a plaintiff must show that,
apart from the official justification, the defendant would have been a common law
tortfeasor. Obviously Mrs. Frothingham's complaint did not fit into such a framework.
See Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 320

U.S. 707 (1943).

26. W. CROSSxEY, supra note 13, at 978-81. Cf. C. HAIESp, TIE AEruc,

oF JuDICIAL SUPREMACY

531 (2d ed. 1932).

Docru.NE

27. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALx L.J. 517,524 (1966). See also FED. R. App. P. 44.
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"no case of private rights or private property infringed, or in danger of
actual or threatened infringement, ' 28 although it seemed clear that this
federalism issue could be raised by pri.,ate litigants.2D
Surely the reasoning of these decisions is wholly unsatisfactory. The
Reconstruction cases presented major questions concerning federalism
and the separation of powers; the real contestants were Congress and
the states.3 0 Although the notion of what constitutes private rights has
been judicially expanded in recent years to encompass whatever may
be characterized as "injury in fact" to the plaintiff, the private rights
model remains formally unimpaired: Constitutional adjudication is
still viewed as the by-product of preventing unjustified injury to private interests.
B.

The Special Function Model

That the Constitution needs authoritative interpretation is no longer
open to rational dispute. The Court's monopoly on this prerogative is
so firmly established that, as Professor Bickel observes, "[s]ettled expectations" of the body politic have come to depend on it in myriad ways. 1
While one can readily agree that the Court rather than the political
branches is uniquely suited for this task,82 it is by no means evident that
it should be a function of ordinary litigation concerning private rights.
Judicial review in other countries, particularly those not in the com33
mon law tradition, is not tied to such a limitation.
It is error to assume that, either as a matter of case or controversy
or of substantive law, constitutional adjudication absent some specific
28. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1868). The same reasoning was applied in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484-85 (1923).
29. The cases did suggest that dismissal of the states' suits was required because the
issues were "political" questions. But the "political" character of the suits seems ud
timately to have been simply a function of the character .of the plaintiffs, not the
issues, of the cases. No doubts about justiciability were raised when personal rights were
at stake. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 85 (1869); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
30. Professors Frankfurter, Landis, arid Jaffe make the same point with respect to
the "real" litigants in Humphrey's Ex'r v. 0nited States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 6, at 315; Jaffe,
The Citizen as Litigant, supra note 23, at 1041.
31. A. BICKEL, supra note 14, at 14.
32. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 519, 523-24
(1970). Clifton McCleskey's nineteenth century examples to the contrary notwithstanding,
see McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion, 3 HOuSTON L.
REv. 354, 360-61 (1966), Congress in the twentieth century is far too overwhelmed to
give systematic and coherent development to constitutional principles.
33. Kauper, The Supreme Court: Hybrid Organ of State, 21 Sw. L.J. 573, 590 (1967).
This is all the more striking because the idea of judicial review is American in orliln,
despite its European antecedents. Cappelletti & Adams, judicial Review of Legislation:
European Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1207 (1966). For descriptions
of other models see M. CAPPELLETrI, JUDICIAL REvIEW IN THE CONTE5I'OssARY WORLD Ch.
3 (1971); Rosenn, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 1411, 1417-20 (1972).
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complaint of injury in fact is beyond judicial competence. In his dissent in Baker v. Carr,Justice Frankfurter indicated that no "case or
controversy" existed where the substantive assertion is simply that "the
frame of government is askew." 3 4 But why not? Recent decisions in
administrative law recognize that plaintiffs often assert broad and diffuse interests-such as those of consumers or users of the "environment"-which do not involve the litigants' individual status. The "public" action, 35 now recognized to have had deep roots in British legal
history,36 has fully surfaced. Both developments have radically altered
assumptions about what constitutes a sufficient predicate for judicial
action. In the words of Professor Jaffe:
Although it may seem anomalous to posit a right of the people
which is not the right of any person in particular, we are becoming more and more familiar with the judicial enforcement of public or group interests at the suit of individuals and groups who may
or may not be direct beneficiaries of the judgment.3 7
It is quite plausible that a part of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and religion, or more generally, of "liberty" and
"property" as now understood, include a right to complain of the existence of unconstitutional legislation." At bottom, Justice Frankfurter's
denial that a citizen's interest in governmental regularity is "real" ignores the increasingly evident "public" nature of constitutional adjudication. It fails to recognize that many rights may be held in gross as well
as in personam.
The underpinnings of the private rights model have been weakened
further by the recognition that constitutional adjudication is, fundamentally, a "political-legal" undertaking only loosely analogous to "ordinary" judicial litigation. As Frankfurter and Landis observed long
34. 369 U.S. 186, 267, 298-300 (1962).
35. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACrION 459-500 (1965).
36. B~rger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?,
78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
37. Jaffe, 'The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness
and Access, 85 HIAv. L. REv. 768, 774 (1972). See also Duggan, Standing to Sue: A Con-

mentary on Injury in Fact, 22

CASE

W. REs. L. Rrv. 256, 273-74 (1971); Viner, Direct

Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69

ficu. L RM'.

1443, 1471-75 (1971).
38. One basis for such an argument might run as follows. One of the rights a citizen
has is that legislative bodies consider only constitutionally permissible factors in formu.
lating rules designed for the common good. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 Sul. CT. REV. 1, 95,

116, 118. This means that a citizen has an interest in the process, as well as the
product, of legislation:

In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
liberty must be broad indeed.

Bd.of Regents v. Roth, 408 US. 564, 572 (1972).
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ago in their classic study of federal jurisdiction, the task of judges in
constitutional cases differs from that of common law judges in "the
context of the materials, the nature of the interests, and the technique
of adjudication." 39 It calls for judgments dealing with the distribution
of political power in which the Court, on the basis of "broad and undefined clauses," 40 is asked to reject the choices made by the otherwise
concededly supreme law-making institutions of our society.4 1 The analogy to ordinary litigation is largely formal: Constitutional determinations merely occur in the context of the traditional lawsuit familiar to
all lawyers.
Today there is virtually unanimous agreement that the Court has a
"special function" with regard to the Constitution because it is the
final authoritative interpreter of constitutional text. "Whatever the
rationale to support the theory and practice," observes Professor Kauper, "Americans take it for granted that the Supreme Court will exercise [the] power [of judicial review]. We accept the Court as an organ
necessary to the constitutional order. ' 42 It is, accordingly, today simply
unacceptable for the Court to dismiss as beyond judicial competence
challenges by Congress to the practice of the pocket veto or to presidential attempts to impound funds solely because traditional "private"
interests are not at stake; 43 it is unacceptable to dismiss state challenges
to federal authority or a case of far-reaching national importance, simply because the particular litigants no longer have a "personal interest"
44
in the outcome.
Once the Court's "special function" and the "unique" character of
constitutional adjudications are stressed, "the old notion that the power
to decide constitutional questions is simply incident to the power to
dispose of a concrete case loses much of its substance. ' 4 Marbury itself
provides the basis for a different model of judicial competence. In its
repeated emphasis that a written constitution imposes limits on every
organ of the state, 46 Marbury welded judicial review to the political
axiom of limited government. However frequently limited government
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 6, at 307.
40. Id. at 308.
41. A. BiCKaL, supra note 14, at 16-23. See also R. JACKSON, supra note 7, at 55.57
(1955); Braden, The Search for Objectivity in ConstitutionalLaw, 57 YALE L.J. 571, 572-73
(1948).

39.

42. Kauper, supra note 33, at 590.
43. Perhaps the Court could strain these cases into established authority through
reliance on its 5-4 decision in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438.42 (1939) (granting
standing to state senators challenging right of lieutenant governor to cast tie-breaking
vote on proposed constitutional amendment).
44. Cf. Brennan, J., dissenting in Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 212 (1972).
45. Kauper, supra note 33, at 577.
46. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 176-77 (1803).
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and private rights were joined, eighteenth century thinkers did not
believe that protection of private rights exhausted the justification for
the enforcement of constitutional limits. 47 Accordingly, in substantially
recasting our thinking about the appropriate occasions for judicial review, we need not face the impact of a specific and restrictive historical
intention. 48 This is a situation where, in Holmes' phrase, "the present
49
has a right to govern itself as far as it can."
Because the Court has the "special function" in our frame of government to declare authoritatively the meaning of the Constitution,
at least when Congress so authorizes the Court may properly render
such pronouncements whether or not recognizable private interests are
involved. A "special function" model of judicial competences0 would
perceive constitutional litigation
as "public actions," which may or
may not involve private rights. 51 To a significant extent, the "special
function" model, in fact, has already been adopted, although its contours are vague. If it is to be an acceptable guide for the appropriateness of judicial review, however, its form must be made explicit.
II. The Contours of a Special Function Model
A "special function" model for constitutional adjudication would
require, at the very least, that issues be sharply defined and capable of
judicial solution. Beyond that, it also would require that the rate at
which constitutional issues arise in the courts be controlled so as to
insure that judicial intervention not overwhelm the political branches.
A.

Issues Sharply Defined

The first limitation might suggest that the form in which the issue
is presented be that of a traditional lawsuit invoking traditional remedies. Flast v. Cohen, for example, states that standing is "related" to
the question of "whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
47. "Limited government" was the common bond uniting political discussion about
the meaning of such diverse concepts as a written constitution, fundamental law, social
contract, separation of powers, and federalism. See C. HAiNEs, supra note 26, at 204-31.
See generally the note and materials contained in H. HART & W. WECISLER, supra note
5, at 9 n.34; 3 J. STORY, supra note 17, at 373-97. Cf. Nelson, Changing Conceptions Of
Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790.1860, 120
U. PA. L. REv. 1166, 1170-71 (1972).
48. See C. MiLLER, THE SUPRE.ME COURT AND THE UsEs OF Tim HIsro..

161-69 (1969).

49. 0. HOL,%mS, CoL. w-ED LEGAL PAPERS 121 (1921).
50. Cf. Kauper, supra note 33, at 587; D. CURRiE, FrnRAL COURTS, CSS AND MATERIALS
5, 31-33 (1968).
51. The traditional theory, of course, has been nearly the oppoite, the "public"
aspects of constitutional adjudication being viewed a happy by.product of the assertion
of private rights. See, e.g., Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1034 (9th Cir. 1972).
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presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution."5 2 But in a document intended "to endure for ages to come," 53 this language cannot mean that we are frozen
to the judicial forms and proceedings understood by the judges at
Westminster. 54 Nor can it mean that remedial considerations are decisive as to the existence of a case or controversy. While a court might
conclude, for example, that settled principles of the separation of powers preclude coercive relief against the President, a declaratory judgment might still be appropriate.r
It is necessary only that the constitutional question be presented in
a manner sufficiently concrete for resolution of the problem. This requires adequate factual information if the Court is to avoid "dialectics
... [and] sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.""0 Although there
are, to be sure, constitutional cases where, in Frankfurter's words,
"facts, and facts again, are decisive" 57-for example, questions of substantive due process, the reach of federal power under the Commerce
Clause, and the nature of the "compelling state interest" standard-in
other cases specific factual variations have little bearing on the proper
resolution of the constitutional question. 8 Here, to borrow a metaphor, the issues can be addressed at wholesale, rather than at retail. The
danger, of course, is the tendency to believe that this second category
is much larger than it actually is, particularly where the "adjudicative"
facts of the controversy seem clear, but where the constitutional ques52. 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
53. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819).
54. "[T~he Constitution does not require that the case or controversy should be
presented by traditional forms of procedure, invoking only traditional remedies ....
It did not crystallize into changeless form the procedure of 1789 ...
" Nashville, C.
& St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933).
55. Because of the relative novelty of the declaratory judgment procedure, our traditions are just beginning to shake their preoccupation with problems of enforcement.
Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517-18 (1969) where the Court expressly recognized that declaratory relief might be awarded even if there were constitutional problems with coercive relief. It is, accordingly, evident that one could succeed in suing a
presidential subordinate as in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952). However, the separation of powers would prevent calling the President to testify
since that would materially interfere with the discharge of his duties. To the extent
that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (No.
14, 692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1803) suggests the contrary, it must be restricted to situations
where the Due Process Clause or the Sixth Amendment requires the testimony-as, for
example, where the President could provide an alibi in a murder case.
56. Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1924).
57. Id. at 1013.
58. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 66, 67. The "overbreadth" decisions also apparently represent a judgment that facts are relatively unimportant. See, e.g., Coates
v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1970); Comment, First Amendment Overbrcadth Doctrine,
83 HARV. L. Rav. 844, 863 (1970). In the "newspaperman's privilege" case, Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), there were sharply different assumptions about the critical
facts. Compare the opinion of the court, id. at 693-94, with the dissent of Stewart, J.,
id. at 735-36.
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tion turns on certain legislative facts-for example, facts bearing on
matters of economic or social organization.a
Where resolution of the constitutional question turns on a careful
factual assessment, the Court might properly decline to adjudicate the
issue absent an appropriate record.0 0 Even here, however, there are occasions when the Court might (indeed perhaps must) express its view
on the substantive issues, although that expression must be understood
to be of a relatively abstract, tentative nature. 0 ' The GeorgiaBlow Post
cases illustrate the latter situation. In the first of the two cases, the
Court in reviewing a criminal conviction, rejected a Commerce Clause
challenge to a state statute requiring that trains stop at railroad crossing, saying that the pleadings "set forth no facts which would make
the operation of the statute unconstitutional."' 0 2 Seven years later, however, the Court reached a contrary result because the evidence showed
that compliance would have extended a scheduled four and one-half
hour run by six hours. 3
Flast's requirement of an "adversary context"0' 4 also suggests that the
constitutional requirement of a "case" might preclude advisory opinons
because at least two adversaries are needed. Thus, for example, even
assuming sufficient statutory authorization, the Court rightly refused
Washington's request for legal advice on a long list of issues concerning American neutrality in the war between England and France. 5
Concededly, the lack of an adversary presentation increases the risk
that the Court's constitutional pronouncements will not be sufficiently
considered. 66 But that hazard hardly seems to be one of constitutional
dimension. In principle, it is difficult to assert that "real" adversaries
are necessary to the existence of a case or controversy; witness, for example, default judgments, guilty pleas, consent decrees, confessions of
error by the solicitor general, naturalization and bankruptcy proceedings-situations where the parties have something to gain or lose, but
59. See Adams v. Turner, 244 U.S. 590, 597, 600 (1916) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Sc
also Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 517, 520 (1924); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1904). Cf. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 6, at 310.
60. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); HART & WECitSLm,
supra note 5, at 657-59; Scharpf, supra note 27, at 519.
61. See, e.g., Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 549.50 (1947).
62. Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 US. 524, 536 (1909).
63. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1916).
64. 392 U.S. at 101 (1968). This requirement is frequently stated in the Court's opinions.
See, e.g., Goosby v. Osser, 93 S. Ct. 754 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
65. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 64. But, even here, would not the difficulty of
lack of adversary parties have been met if the Court gave notice to England and France
to brief and argue the issues raised? If they defaulted on the opportunity, that could
hardly be said to deprive the Court of "jurisdiction."
66. P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrID STATES 17 (1961); Comment, First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844, 863 (1970).
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where they agree on the facts and/or the law.0 7 At least where the crucial facts are relatively undisputed, all that seems constitutionally necessary is for a petitioner to present relevant facts in sufficiently concrete
form.68 In "public" actions I doubt that Article III can be read to
require the presentation of argument on any question of law or fact.,
Where private rights are affected, Article III or the guarantees of the
First, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments might arguably require more,7 0 but
that seems doubtful so long as any affected private party could subsequently challenge the rules announced by the Court and relitigate any
71
adjudicative facts.
B. Amenable to JudicialResolution
The second limitation arguably derivable from Article III is that
the issue be amenable to judicial resolution, i.e., that there be some
judicially manageable standards for deciding the case. Presently, this
requirement is largely subsumed under the "political question" umbrella.7 2 Not surprisingly, as the Court comes more and more to see
itself as the authoritative expositor of the Constitution, the range of
nonjusticiable political questions has shrunk. 73 But there are still instances where the Court simply cannot fashion applicable rules, normally because of a lack of relevant factual information. Where the
facts on which the decision must rest are complicated, uncertain, and
67.

K. DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 118-19 (1958).

68. Cf. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1925), where the Court recognized an
uncontested naturalization petition as a case or controversy. To be sure, the Court
said that the government "is always a possible adverse party," id. at 597, but that seems
merely a makeweight. Of course, in Tutun, as in guilty pleas and default judgment cases,
one party seeks to enforce or deprive another of a valuable and traditionally recognized
personal or property interest. But as argued above, the nature of the interest is not a limitation on the Court's power which stems from Article Ill. Moreover, it is surely no gtaran.
tee that there will be adversary presentation of either the law or the facts.
69. "The Court may ascertain as it sees fit any fact that is merely a ground for
laying down a rule of law.
...Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548 (1924);
cf. K. DAVIs, 1 ADM. LAW TREATISE 407-512 (1958); 300-69 (Supp. 1970).
70. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 252 U.S. 22 (1932). See also Movaghan, supra note
32, at 520-21 n.13.
71. I recognize that this reasoning entails a reformulation of the relationship of rcs
judicata to case or controversy doctrine. Compare Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig
Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1926), with Hoover Co. v. Coe, 325 U.S. 79 (1944), and Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 576 (1961).
72. For a collection of other materials on the political question doctrine see P. KAUvnT,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 49 (1972). See also Tigar, Judicial Power, The
"Political Question Doctrine" and Foreign Relations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1135 (1970).
73. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 US. 15 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. '186
(1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Though the primary concern of the political
question doctrine is judicially manageable standards, even where they exist, tileCourt
may conclude that there has been a clear textual commitment of the issue to the
political branches. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). So far as this Is a
separate category, it seems to me now arguable only with respect to the impeachment
power (U.S.CONSr. art. I, §§ 2 & 3), and the power of Congress to determine whether a
representative or senator satisfies the constitutional requirement of age, etc. Id.
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unverifiable in traditional judicial terms, or disguise what are really
matters of judgment, it becomes exceedingly difficult to formulate any
constitutional rules, except those of the most absolute character.7 4 In
such instances, the relationship between ripeness and political question
is readily apparent, as both commentatorsla and the Court 0 have recognized: They are connected on a continuum, with the political question
bar at that point where factual difficulties become relatively intractable.
The unresolved question is whether there are cases where the political question difficulty is not factual. It is questionable, for example,
whether the Court could ever formulate standards for resolving issues
under the Guarantee Clause no matter how concrete the factual pattern.77 The Court could, of course, formulate standards so loose that,
in effect, it had no real role in reviewing the actions of the political
organs.78 But on the whole, I prefer the alternative course suggested
by Professor Jaffe-the frank recognition that these may be areas
where we prefer to operate wholly or substantially without any rules
at all.7 9

III. Congress and the Special Function Model
The central question in the "special function" model is what quality
of the litigant's interest will suffice to justify the exercise of judicial
review. While it is no longer possible to conclude that injury is in fact
a constitutional prerequisite, it does not necessarily follow that a special
function model makes constitutional adjudications available on demand. The special function model still requires some appropriate
boundary.
Primarily, the special function model must account for a crucial
feature of the American system of judicial review: its decentralized
74. Professor Cox is of the view that the Vietnam War constitutes a political question
because the only rules that could be formulated and administered would be Impractically rigid. Compare Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40
U. CINN: L. REv. 197, 201-06 (1972) with Tigar, supra note 72. See also Atlec v. Laird,
347 F. Supp. 689, 693 et seq. (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three-judge court), aff d per curiam, 93
S. Ct. 1545 (1973) (three justices dissenting).
75. Scharpf, supra note 27, at 527-33. See also HARr & WactisrEn, supra note 5. at 241.
76. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). See also the discussion in First National
City Bank v. Banco National de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), particularly the opinion of
Brennan, J., id. at 790, on the relationship of the act of state doctrine to the principles
which underlie the political questions doctrine; cf. Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146,
1148 (2d Cir. 1973); Mitchell v. Laird, 41 U.S.L.W. 2526 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 1973).
77. But see Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study In Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1962). See also O'Brien v. Brown, 409 US. 1. 4
(1972), intimating that the operation of national nominating conventions raised serious
problems of nonjusticiahility; Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1152-56 (2d Cir. 1973).
78. This seems to be Professor Scharpf's preference, supra note 27, at 561.
79. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF AD.MINISTRATIvE ACTION 491 (1965).
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character. Every court, high or low, state or federal, passes on the constitutional questions in cases properly before it. This follows not only
from Article VI, but more importantly, from Marbury's fundamental
premise that the Constitution is to be applied as ordinary law. The
decentralized character of our system of judicial review stands in
marked contrast to many other systems in which a single or limited
number of tribunals pass on constitutional questions, and then only in
certain contexts.8 0 Given the abundance of "ideological" plaintiffs and
the ready availability of class actions, dispensing entirely with any
requirement of a personal interest would raise the level and quality of
judicial intervention at all levels of the political order. Further, any
significant increase in the number of constitutional adjudications emanating from the lower courts might critically impair the ability of a
Supreme Court, already hard pressed, to give coherent direction to
our corpus of constitutional law. 8 '
My own view is that expressed by Justice Harlan, dissenting in
Flast.8 2 After rejecting the Court's effort at characterizing a taxpayer's
interest in Establishment Clause questions as a "personal" one, Justice
Harlan argued that the doors of the federal courts should not be thrown
open to "ideological" or "nonHohfeldian" plaintiffs without congressional authorization.3 That position rests on the premise that the judicial prerogative to render constitutional expositions cannot be asserted
independently of the will of the political branches of government. Any
expansion of judicial jurisdiction should come only with the explicit
concurrence of Congress, 4 a political assumption inherent in the constitutional grant of power to Congress over the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.8 5 This may be a difficult proposition for those who base the
80. See M. CAPPELLETrI, supra note 33, at 45-66; Rosenn, supra note 33, at 1413 (1972).

81. The seriousness of this problem is attested to not only by recent decisions narrowing the exercise of original jurisdiction, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93
(1972); Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 113 (1972), but also by the
recommendations of a special panel of experts, supported by Chief Justice Burger, for
a "national court of appeals." REPORT ON THE CASE LOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, STUDY
GROUP OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (1972). Incredibly, Mr. Justice Douglas has sug-

gested that the members of the Court are "vastly underworked" and have "vast leisure,"
Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States and Phillips Petroleum Co., 93 S. Ct. 408, 423 (1972)
(dissenting opinion).
82. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
83. Id. at 107 (dissenting opinion).
84. I do not agree with Professor Jaffe that the Court should develop, without con.
gressional guidance, a series of rules as to which public actions should and which should
not be entertained. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant, supra note 23, at 1038.
85. Congressional authority to "ordain and establish" the lower federal courts, U.S.
CONST. art. III, § I, has long been held to include the power to limit the jurisdiction

of these courts over enumerated controversies. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S.
182 (1943); Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938); Sheldon v. Sill, 49
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Court's prerogatives in a separation of powers model. They would
argue that congressional power over the jurisdiction of the inferior
federal courtss is different from the congressional power to control the
Court's appellate jurisdiction: Even if there were no lower federal
courts, the Supreme Court could assert its prerogative on appeals from
the state courts by narrowly construing the scope of congressional
power over its appellate jurisdiction. 7
Nevertheless, our separation of powers tradition leaves considerable
room for shifting accommodations among the three branches.8 8 Nothing in that tradition gives the Supreme Court or any other court a right
to insist that it give opinions, although where private rights are involved
Article III or other provisions of the Constitution might guarantee private parties access to some court on constitutional questions., Accordingly, I see nothing anomalous in the "untidy proposition" that the
Supreme Court is the final expositor of the Constitution only so long
as it "has the assent and the cooperation first of the political institutions, and ultimately of the people"°0 -at least where "traditional" personal rights are not at stake. To this extent I agree with Professor
Wechsler that a contrary view is "antithetical to the plan of the constitution for the courts-which was quite simply that the Congress would
decide from time to time how far the federal judicial institutions would
be used within the limits of the federal judicial power." 0'
Not only does a special function model presuppose constitutional
pronouncements only by way of an acquiescent Congress; it also leaves
considerable room for congressional participation in the form and
mode of constitutional adjudications not involving substantial personal
02
rights.
US. (8 How.) 441 (1850). The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is expressly
made subject to "such Exceptions .. .as the Congress shall make." U.S. Co.sr. art. Ill,
§ 2; See Ex parle McCardle, 74 US. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868).
86. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362 (1953). For a more recent discussion, see
Note, The Nixon Busing Bills and CongressionalPower, 81 YALE L.J. 1542, 1547-53 (1972).
87. Professor Hart, for example, suggests the vague-and wholly inadministrableidea that "the exceptions [to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction] must not be
such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan."
supra
66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1365 (1953). For other suggestions see HART & WEC'.%E,
note 5, at 362-65.
88. Monaghan, PresidentialWar Making, 50 B.U. L. REv. 19, 24-25 (1970) (special issue).
89. Exploration of this issue is of course far beyond the compass of this paper. See
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1539-1629; Monaghan. supra note 32, at 518.
90. A. Bcs., THE SUPRFMiE COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROcRESS 90 (1970).
91. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 CoLur. L. REv. 1005 (1965).
92. "Legislation concerning judicial organization throughout our history has been a
very empiric response to very definite needs." FRANKFr RTa & LANois, supra note 6, at
13. Of course, in view of Article MiI,§ 2, original jurisdiction could not be given to the
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First, Congress might restrict the occasions in which "public actions"
could be maintained. It might tighten standing and mootness requirements in constitutional cases; alternatively, it might differentiate among
different classes of public actions, by, for example, refusing standing to
those challenging the validity of federal expenditures. Or Congress
might make wholly ad hoc responses to the issues of standing and mootness-perhaps according standing only in cases where some specific action by it or the executive raised severe constitutional questions. Finally,
Congress might limit the right to bring public actions to organizations
that had first satisfied the Court of their "capacity" to develop concrete
and manageable constitutional issues.
Second, Congress might reject altogether the decentralized system of
judicial review for "public action" suits. It might, for example, confine such litigation to special constitutional courts with further review
to the Supreme Court only by certiorari. And it might condition access
to these special courts on preliminary findings of, in Judge Hand's
phrase, "how importunately the situation demands an answer" 3-thus
weeding out wholly "academic" cases. Alternatively, the Freund Colnmittee's proposed "national court of appeals" might be used to screen
public actions, eliminating unimportant or insubstantial cases from
Supreme Court consideration.

4

Third, Congress might simply restrict the remedies available to plaintiffs in public actions, perhaps denying coercive relief and permitting
only declaratory judgments. Or, less drastically, Congress might withdraw the judicial power to grant interlocutory injunctions in public
actions save on the showing of the most exigent circumstances.
Leaving to Congress the shaping of the special function model might,
of course, be viewed as an assault on federalism. If sound, the special
function model apparently means that Congress might authorize every
citizen of every state to challenge the validity of any statute anywhere;
the federal character of the government, with what is embodied in the
vague concept of "state sovereignty," seems inconsistent with citizens
spanning the width and breadth of the land cleaning up state statute
books. 5 Three responses can be made to such a vision: First, Congress
may lack the affirmative power to authorize such actions under any of
Supreme Court. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). That the time has
come for a thoroughgoing congressional reexamination of the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts is demonstrated brilliantly by Judge Friendly in H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDIcTION:

A

GENERAL VIEW

(1973).

93. L. HAND, THE BiLL OF RIGHTS 15 (1958).
94. See note 81 supra.
95. Such a suggestion was received with evident hostility in Socialist Labor Party
v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972).
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its granted powers, broad as they are.9 0 That question is beyond the
scope of this article. But it might only be noted that the objection, if
it be one, does not flow from the private rights model; and it surely
provides no barrier to congressionally-authorized suits against federal
officials. Second, even if Congress seemed to possess the power to authorize such actions, "Our Federalism"-as Justice Black termed it in
9 7-might be seen
Younger v. Harris
as imposing inherent limitations
on congressional power to determine the "who" and "when" of constitutional adjudication. This argument, of course, is simply the old
wine of "dual federalism" in a new bottle. 98 The question is whether
congressional action could be rationally related to one of the great
heads of congressional power. If it can, that automatically disposes of
any "Our Federalism" objection. 9 Finally, the whole federalism problem may, after all, be little more than an academic exercise: 200 If Congress felt impelled to enact on a wholesale basis legislation of the character considered here, the political consequences would be so serious
that constitutional doctrine would be of little moment. And yet, a congressional authorization of certain specific suits by citizens against their
own state officials, contrary to that state's law on standing, mootness,
or the separation of powers, seems a rational exercise of the powers
granted Congress under Article I, § 8 and/or the enforcement provisions' 0 1 of the Civil War Amendments. Hence the state, as well as the
federal, courts would be compelled to vindicate congressional policy. 02
IV. The Present Status of the Special Function Model
To a significant extent the Court has already discarded the view that
the existence of a private right is not only sufficient but also necessary
for judicial review. Standing, mootness, ripeness, and sovereign immunity-the principal repositories of the private rights model-have
96. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1971), contains the most recent discussion of
the range of congressional power under U.S. Co.Nsr. amend. XIV, § 5. See also Linda R. S.
v. Richard D. and Texas, 93 S. Ct. 1146 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205,212 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
97. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
98.

Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950). Even today,

however, this doctrine occasionally surfaces. See United States v. Oregon, 366 US. 643
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

99. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Cf. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
100. Far more realistic is the felt need to withdraw certain types of cvil rights
litigation from southern federal trial courts. See, e.g., Allen v. State ld. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544 (1969).
101. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 5; amend. XV, § 6.
102. Linda R. S. v. Richard D. and Texas, 93 S. Ct. 1146 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
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been substantially recast in recent decades; they now foreclose judicial
review only infrequently and erratically. Moreover, the present underpinnings of these doctrines are fully consistent with a special function
model of judicial competence.
A.

Standing
Erosion of standing as an embodiment of the private rights model is
largely a by-product of the rise of the administrative agencies. 103 "The
availability of judicial review," observes Professor Jaffe, "is the necessary condition psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid."10 4
Irresistible pressure was thus generated to accord judicial review to
anyone substantially affected by administrative action, whether or not
he asserted interests comparable to those protected by the common law
judges. 10 5 In part, of course, the "new standing" could be shoehorned
somewhat uncomfortably into the traditional private rights model:
Welfare payments and other governmental entitlements constituted if
not "vested property rights"'' 0 at least a "new property"1 07 entitled to
some measure of judicial protection. Accordingly, judicial review of
administrative actions affecting such interests still presented "a question concerning [the litigant's] own legal status."' 08 But the occasions
for judicial review have now spread beyond this category to persons
asserting broad and diffuse interests, for example, consumers or users
of the environment. 0 9 We have, in short, been living with the public
action for some time.
To be sure, standing is still denied on occasion, but the criteria have
become confused and trivialized. In Sierra Club v. Morton,110 for example, the Court, by a vote of four to three, held that a conservation
group lacked standing to challenge governmental environmental policy
absent at least an allegation that the organization's members used the
103. For recent discussion see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 150.214: Scott,
Standing to Sue in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. Rav. 645 (1973).
104. L. JAFFE, supra note 35, at 320.
105. Professor Davis has been a powerful and convincing advocate of this view. K.
DAVIS, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATSE 208-94 (1958).

106. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). See also United States v. Jim, 409 U.S.
80 (1972).
107. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
108. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant,supra note 23, at 1033.
109. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 n.7, 738-39 & nn.13-14 (1972). See
also Sedler, Standing,Justiciability,and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. RE.
479, 503-11 (1972). On no basis could one conclude that, once stripped of their official
capacity, the official defendants were acting like common law tortfeasors toward the
plaintiffs. Cf. Linda R. S. v. Richard D. and Texas, 93 S. Ct. 1146 (1973); Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
110. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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affected area. But Sierra Club recognized that nothing in the "case or
controversy" clause required such a result. The majority apparently
assumed that the previously developed standing rules were wholly subject to congressional alteration: "[A] personal interest in the outcome
of the litigation" is necessary, said Justice Stewart, only "where a person does not rely on any specific statute authorizing invocation of the
judicial process."' 1 1 Despite the fact that Sierra Club's predecessors did
not indicate that Congress could wholly dispense with an "injury in
fact" requirement, 112 this view was reaffirmed in Linda R. S. v. Richard D. and Texas." 3 There, in an unfortunate example of intellectual
confusion, the Court said that "injury in fact" was a constitutional requirement but that congressional statutes conferring standing automatically satisfy it."1

Roe v. Wade1 further illustrates such confusion. There the Court
held that an abortion controversy was not moot with respect to an unmarried woman who was pregnant at the time of the suit but not, so far
as the record showed, at time of oral argument: The issue, said the
Court, might occur again. But the Court then held that a married
couple regularly having intercourse lacked any "standing." The attempted distinction between the two situations on Article III grounds
seems without rationality. Perhaps the Court might have properly dismissed the married couple petition for want of ripeness, but certainly
not for lack of standing." 0
However much their confused character attracts the attention of
commentators, such cases are of increasingly marginal significance.""
Standing as a constitutional limitation on the exercise of judicial power
simply could not survive the onset of the administrative agencies once
the courts assumed the task of limiting the agencies' power. And, of
course, the standing developments in administrative law carried over
111. Id. at 732.
112. See Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also comment on
Sierra Club in Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAMI. L. REv. 1, 236, 238 (1972).
113.

93 S. Ct. 1146 (1973).

114. Id. at 1148 n.3.
115. 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
116. The confusion between ripeness and standing becomes even more pronounced
once the Court's discussion of the "standing" of clergy, nurses and social workers to
challenge abortion statutes is examined. See Doe v. Dolton, 93 S. Ct. 739, 756 (1973). See
also Cheaney v. Indiana, 285 N.E.2d 265 (Ind. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1516 (1973)
(denial of standing of non-doctor performing abortion).
117. In addition to the cases previously discussed see also Chief Justice Burger's denial
of a stay in Aberdeen & Rockfish Co. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S. 1207 (1972). Cf. Ragland v.
Volpe, 455 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972) (denying standing
to Florida citizens and highway users challenging apportionment of federal highway
funds); Galliot v. HEW, 464 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 559 (1972)
(citizens lack standing to challenge HEW policy of denying funds to state hospitals which
classify blood of donors by race).
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into constitutional adjudication. While judicial opinions still abound
with talk about the necessity for a "personal interest," that concept
bears very little resemblance to its ancestor in the earlier private rights
model. 1 " To be sure, Sierra Club makes clear the Court's present unwillingness to announce that all citizens have standing to attack governmental action; some showing of "injury in fact," however loosely
defined, is still required. 119 But the concept has been so diluted that
even the most trivial interest will suffice. 12- 0 The implications of this
development are, of course, far reaching: If no part of standing is of
Article III dimensions, the character of the interests asserted by the
plaintiff has no constitutional significance.
One could, of course, retain a "personal interest" requirement in
constitutional cases even if a more relaxed standard were applied elsewhere. The justification for such a differentiation could be based in
the "special" nature of constitutional litigation;121 the source of the
differentiation would be located, not in Article III, but in the discretion inherent in the granting of injunctions and declaratory judgments. 1 22 But, as yet, there has been no coherent judicial development
of such a differentiation. Moreover, other developments confirm the
demise of traditional standing limitations, even in constitutional cases.
Recent decisions apparently now sanction the right of.the states to
raise federalism claims.'12 3 Since no pretense can be made that these
cases involve "private" rights, Professor Bickel is clearly correct in concluding that they stand in open contradiction to the Reconstruction
cases and Massachusetts v. Mellon.

24

The explosion of class actions in constitutional cases further illustrates the point. Given the breadth of the relief given in these cases,
they in fact serve as "public" actions vindicating broad public interests
not protected under the traditional private rights model. As Professor
Cappelletti observes:
118. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968); Richardson v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, No. 71-1535 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 31, 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3569
(U.S. Apr. 23, 1973); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 452 (D.D.C. 1972) (threejudge court).
119. 405 U.S. at 439-40 (1972).
120. See Note, Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 238-39 (1972); DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 428-29 (1972).
121. Compare Scharpf, supra note 27, at 528-29, with Fortas, J., concurring and dissenting in Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 181 (1967).
122. Cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); Finley v. Hamp.
ton, 473 F.2d 180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
123. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301 (1966).
124. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 79, 84-90. Wholly apart from
the states' standing, it is doubtful the Court should have accepted original jurisdiction
(U.S: CONST. art. III, § 2) over these suits, since the "citizenship" of the federal defendants was wholly immaterial to the suit.
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By its nature the class action asks for more than inter pares relief;
it takes away the cushioning effects provided by the fact that the
significance of traditional constitutional cases was felt only gradually as successive individual litigants sought to vindicate their
newly defined rights.' 25
Perhaps more than any other single development, the mushrooming
of class actions has rendered the private rights model largely~unintelligible. When coupled with the judicial freedom inherent in making
prospective constitutional pronouncements, 12 0 widespread use of the
class action may alter both the frequency and scope of judicial interference with the political process. Similarly, suits by "the government' 127 to vindicate "individual" constitutional rights-with or without express statutory authority' 28-are class actions that involve the
same substantial shift from the "cushioning" presuppositions of the
29
private rights model.
B. Mootness
Recent mootness cases further confirm the emergence of the special
function model.' 30 The various justifications traditionally offered for
dismissing cases which have become moot on appeal suggest radically
different conceptions of the nature of federal judicial power. One
rationale justifies dismissal in terms of judicial economy: It is argued
that courts are far too busy to "waste" time on disputes where "nothing" is at stake. Clearly, insofar as it assumes that nothing is at stake
if individual rights are not involved, this explanation assumes precisely that which is in issue.' 3 ' Moreover, it fails to explain dismissals
in cases where, although the decision can no longer affect the personal
interests of the litigants, the issue seems certain to recur. 32 Alterna125. M. CAPPELLrxT-,
supra note 33, at 88.
126. See Mishkin, Fomard: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process
of Time and Law, 79 HARy. L. REv. 56, 70-71 (1965); cf. GARVEY, CO.sTrrTTONAL Buco.
LAGE 61-65 (1971) (emphasizing the critical importance of the prospectivc-retrospective distinction in the development of American separation of powers theory).
127. By "government" one means the "Executive" suing in the name of the United
States. This identification of the government with the Executive shows the continued
influence of the prerogative powers in English legal history.
128. Comment, Nonstatutory Executie Authority to Bring Suit, 85 HARv. L. REV.
1566 (1972).
129. Finally, one should make mention of the recent developments which apparently
recognize standing in officials charged with administration of statutes to challenge their
constitutionality. See H. RT
WEcHsLEr, supra note 5, at 182-83.
130. For a survey and collection of the recent Supreme Court cases on mootness, ,cp
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971); HL.nr & Wzcts.an, supra note 5, at 107-22.
131. Comment, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HAM. L. REV. 1672,
1675 (1970).
132. See Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 212 (1972) (Brennan. J.. dissenting):
Alton &S. Ry. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 463 F.2d 872, 878-49 (3d Cir. 1972).
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tively, it has been argued that dismissal of moot cases is required because the federal courts are not empowered to give advisory opinions.'8 3
But this explanation simply restates the subtle problem of just what it
is that makes advisory opinions obnoxious to Article III;184 and it fails
to account for those cases which become moot on appeal in which the
Court is nevertheless presented with a concrete record illuminated by
130
the adversary process.
The explanation most frequently offered is that dismissal is required
because there is no "case or controversy" once the private rights of the
litigants are no longer at stake. 130 Mootness is, therefore, the doctrine
of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that
must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness). 137 Since these two doctrines
share the same root,138 the decline of standing as a barrier to judicial
review has been accompanied by a corresponding decline in the mootness doctrine. To be sure, mootness, like standing, remains formally
intact: Some moot cases are still dismissed. 139 But while the Court continues to assert that moot cases are beyond its power, 40 that position
cannot be derived from case or controversy principles once standing is
seen to be not of Article III dimensions.' 4 ' The mootness cases serve
133. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S.
103, 108 (1969).
134. See H. HART &H. WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 77, 81.
135. Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Also Note, Cases Moot on Ap.
peal: A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 772, 774 (1955):
[M]oot cases do not present all the dangers of advisory opinions. The "Impact of
actuality" may well be lacking if the . . . decree cannot affect the rights of the
parties. But there is a record to which the court may look for facts; there is
probably as much experience under the statute as might be had in a case which
is not moot; and there are advocates before the court who are prepared to argue

the issues.
136. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971).
137. Roe v. Wade, 93 S.Ct. 705, 713 (1973).
138. California v. San Pablo & Turlare R.R., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893) provides a particularly good illustration. Over the objection that the suit had significant precedentlal
value, dismissal for mootness was ordered because:
The duty of this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining
rights of persons or of property which are actually controverted in the particular
case before it. When, in determining such rights, it becomes necessary to give an
opinion upon a question of law, that opinion may have weight as a precedent for
future decisions. But the court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case
before it.
Id. at 314.
139. See, e.g., SEC v. Medical Committee, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972).
140. E.g., North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 496 n.7 (1969).
141. But mootness is a convenient tool for avoiding "hard" cases. See Johnson v. New
York State Educ. Dep't, 93 S. Ct. 259 (1972) (alleged discrimination between rich and
poor). See Scharpf, supra note 27, at 529, commenting on the related problem in ripeness

cases. See generally Singer, Justiciability and Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 21 ALA. L.

R~v. 258-68 (1969).
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to confirm the demise of the personal interest requirement. Thus the
Court seems on the verge of holding that a case is not moot "where
it involves short-term orders, capable of repetition yet evading review,"
even though the parties before it are no longer concerned. 142 It also
seems almost certain that the class action has become an established
vehicle for circumventing mootness; the suit may continue even though
the class representative is no longer directly involved in the outcome.1 43
If one accepts the special function model, the standing and mootness
doctrines must be recast. The Court, aware of its changing role, has in
fact attempted to restate the personal interest requirement. That interest is necessary, the Court now says, in order "to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
issues."' 144 Perhaps in the past a personal interest helped assure this
objective but, if so, it cannot account for dismissing cases which become
moot only after appeal to the Court. Moreover, there is no reason to
believe that litigants with a "personal interest" will present constitutional issues any more sharply or ably than the Sierra Club or the
ACLU. 145 Finally, and most importantly, there is no necessary connection between a personal interest and the sharp presentation of
issues; the latter is readily satisfied by the "ripeness" doctrine without
any reference to the character of the parties involved in the lawsuit.1 40
While the Court's attempt to reformulate standing doctrine confuses
standing with ripeness, the effort is nevertheless significant: It marks
142. See, e.g., Brown v. Chots, 41 U.S.L.W. 4548, 4549 n.5 (U.S. May 7, 1973); Rosario
v. Rockefeller, 93 S. CL 1245, 1249 n.5 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973). The

cases are still somewhat uncertain on this point, however. Compare Moore v. Ogilvie,

394 U.S. 814 (1969) with Halls v Beals, 596 U.S. 45 (1969). Cases such as Carrol v. Commissioners of Princess Anne County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), are distinguishable because
the issue might arise in litigation between the parties. But I think Judge Leventhal is
in error in believing that this is a constitutional requirement. See Alton & S. Ry. Co.
v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 463 F.2d 872, 879.80 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
143. Goosby v. Osser, 93 S. Ct. 854, 856 n.2 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
333 n.2 (1972). But see the suggestion to the contrary in Laird v. Tatum, 403 US. 1,
13-14 n.7 (1972). And see the remand in Indiana Employment Security Division v. Burney,
93 S. Ct. 883 (1973). There plaintiff brought a class action challenging the pre.termination procedures of the Indiana unemployment compensation system. Plaintiff received
compensation, and a remand on mootness was ordered: "Though the appellee purports
to represent a class of all present and future recipients, there are no named representatives of the class except (plaintiff), who has been paid." Id. at 884. The dissent of
Justices Marshall and Brennan argued that, even as to plaintiff, the case was not moot.
Both the Court and the dissent failed to discuss Dunn and Goosby, even though the
latter case was decided on the same day. Even if the case was moot as to the named
plaintiff, it does not follow that it is moot in its class action aspects. Even under Dunn,
however, plaintiffs "cannot represent a class to which they do not belong" at the start
of the litigation. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 93 S. CL 1245, 1250 n.9 (1973).
144. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1961). But see K. DAvs, ADMINISTnATIV LAW
T cr 427 (1972).
145. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant,supra note 23, at 1037.
146. Cf. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
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an ever-increasing awareness of the public nature of constitutional
adjudication. The status of the parties is relevant not in its own right,
but only insofar as it insures a proper presentation of the constitutional
issues. 147 Constitutional exegesis, not the vindication of private rights,
is the core of the Court's task.
C.

Sovereign Immunity

The major barrier to embracing the special function model stems
not from case or controversy but rather from the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. There has been some confusion over the precise reach of
the immunity, particularly where the suit, though cast in the form of
an action against government officials rather than a state or its agency,
seeks in substance to restrain or command governmental activity. Whatever the areas of uncertainty, however, since Ex parte Young 48 it has
been understood that sovereign immunity does not prohibit enjoining
official action which threatens individual rights in violation of the
Constitution. 149 This is, of course, a critical limitation on the scope
of the sovereign immunity doctrine and one which, in the twentieth
century, is indispensable to our understanding of "the rule of law."lt1)
But the rationale for this limitation is a shaky one. The theory is that
the Court "enjoins, in effect, not the execution of the statute, but the
acts of the official, the statute notwithstanding."'' This is appropriate
because an official acting unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official
or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.' ' 5 2 In short, once stripped of his
147. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101 (1968).
148. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
149. See also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corporation, 337 U.S. 682 (1918). See jen.
erally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1339-77. For a thorough discussion of AmcrIcan
cases and their English antecedents, see L. JAFFE, supra note 35, at 197-251.
150. P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUsTICE 1a56 (1968). Damage actions against officials In
their "personal capacities" were, of course, the classic mode of holding the governors
as well as the governed subject to legal rules. See L. JAFFE, supra note 35, at 237-39.
But, in our time, we have come to recognize the inadequacy of this remedy, and accordingly, the necessity for preventive relief. To put the same matter differently, while
originally it may have been thought that constitutional rights could be raised only as
a defense to official proceedings, see Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Gon.
stitution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1532, 1533 n.8 (1972), it is clear that constitutional
guarantees would become meaningless unless appropriate preventive relief Is available.
See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 32, at 543.
151. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
152. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60 (1908). See Osborn v. United States Bank,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 843-44 (1824). This explanation raises the obvious difficulty of
how a substantive violation of the Fourteenth Amendment-which requires state action
-can occur if the defendants are "stripped" of their official mantle. See Note, Sovereign
Immunity in Suits to Enjoin the Enforcement of Unconstitutional Legislation, 50 HAste.
L. REv. 956 (1937).
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statutory justification, the official is simply a common tortfeasor. 2 a
The underlying unity of Ex parle Young and Frothingham v. Mellon,
of sovereign immunity and case or controversy doctrine, is apparent,a 4
and it finds additional expression in several "ripeness" cases. In United
Public Workers v. Mitchell,155 for example, a suit was dismissed because the Court found, "[no] threat of interference ... with the rights
of these appellants appears beyond that implied by the existence of the
law and the regulations."' ao5Taken together, these decisions stand for
the proposition, in Hart's words, that "the quarrel must be with the
official and not the statute,"laT7 and this is not altered by judicial determinations that a statute is "void on its face."1 58
The present doctrine of sovereign immunity displays the unfortunate impact of remedial conceptions on substantive doctrines. Sovereign immunity doctrine was shaped prior to the development of declaratory judgments; like "case or controversy doctrine"15 9 it drew heavily
153. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), contains an early description of the prisate tort
model. In upholding a defense of sovereign inmmunity, the Court distinguished seseral
cases on the ground that "considered apart from the official authority alleged as a
justification, and as a personal act of the individual defendant, [that conduct] constituted a violation of right for which the plaintiff was entitled to a remedy at la%or in equity against the wrongdoer in his individual character." Id. at 502. See also
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 212-16 (1923). Conversely, it seems to be assumed
that unless the official threatens identifiable harm, sovereign inununity bars the suit.
Drawing heavily on Ex parte Young, Ex parle La Prade, 289 U.S. 444 (1933), authorized
dismissal of a suit against a successor Attorney General absent an allegation that the
successor intended to prosecute. However, where the successor took the same p9sition
as his predecessor, substitution was allowed. Allen v. Regents of University System of
Georgia, 304 U.S. 439 (1938). See also Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. La Prude. 2 F. Supp.
855 (1933), affd sub nom. Ex parte La Prade, 289 U.S. 444 (1933). Present Rule 25(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would apparently overrule Ex parte La Prade.
154. But see HALRT & WEcHsLER, supra note 5, at 935. Cf. Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv L. REv. 645, 651 (1973). The argument
that "peaceful" use of the state courts to enforce a state policy is not analogous to any
common law tort ignores the fact that the state court order is backed by force if necessars.
Moreover, any unjustified third-party interference with a commercial relationship is
dearly a tort, whether or not a trespass.
155. 330 US. 75 (1947).
156. Id. at 91.
157.

HART & NVEcsLER, supra note 5, at 148.

158. The judgment still runs against the public official, not the statute books. Moreover, a judgment that a statute is void on its face simply means that a person challenging the statute is not limited to consideration of the statute as applied to him.
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Iris, 407 U.S. 163, 166-67 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 445-46 (1972). Despite the First Circuit's view to the contrary. Coguen v. Smith, 471
F.2d 88, 96 & n.14 (1st Cir. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3616 (U.S. May 21, 1973).
the question seems to me to be a standing one. A statute ostensibl) soid on its face
may nevertheless be subsequently applied to conduct clearly and foresecabl) within its
ambit if an acceptable narrowing structure can be given. California v. LaRue, 409 US.
109 (1972); United States v. Thirty Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 375 n.3 (1971)
(plurality opinion); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50 (1971). Cf. Colten v. Kentucky,
407 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1972), unless, of course, the facial ruling turns on incurable vague.
ness or overbreadth. P. FREUND, supra note 66, at 68-69.
159. Professor Davis has noted the impact of injunction principles on the development of the law of case or controversy. K. DAvis, 3 ADsINSTMrT'vE Lw T nAnsE § 23.05,
at 310 (1958).
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on the assumptions surrounding the availability of injunctions. 100 Efforts to limit the reach of the doctrine were typically heard in the context of suits for injunctive relief, where concern for private rights was
central. Nevertheless, the remedial and sovereign immunity questions
are distinct. Equitable relief may be inappropriate absent a clear threat
of harm, but whether the Court should inquire into the statutory justification for official conduct is a different matter.
Recasting our thinking about sovereign immunity is long overdue.10 1
Its historical function was to bar unauthorized raids on the public
treasury' 0 2 and very little more. The doctrine therefore should be
viewed as limiting only the remedies available to the federal court. 0 3
It is difficult in principle to understand why it should bar a declaratory
judgment concerning the constitutionality of a statute, particularly if
the declaratory judgment would not affect title to funds or property
in the hands of the government. This is the view of Professors Hart and
Wechsler1 64 I would, however, narrow the doctrine still further. To
160. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 216 (1923); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 129 (1908).
161. See generally C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITV
(1972). The most recent Supreme Court discussion appears in the concurring and dissenting opinions in Employees of the Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v. Missouri, 93
S. Ct. 1614 (1973).
162. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793), the Court construed Article
III as permitting a suit by a citizen of South Carolina against the state of Georgia to
enforce a debt obligation. "The decision," said Professor Warren, "fell upon the country
with a profound shock." C. WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
96 (1928). While there was much talk of states' rights, the real fear was for the state
treasury, id. at 99-100, and the Eleventh Amendment was thus adopted. The Supreme
Court has recognized that the Amendment is not, however, to be given a literal interpretation. The Court has applied the Amendment to bar an action by a citizen against
his own state, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); a suit by a federal corporation
against a state, Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1899), and suits in admiralty, Ex parte
New York, 256 U.S. 490, 498-503 (1920), even though none of these actions Is within the
Amendment's literal prohibition. The Court reached these results because it had recognized that, contrary to Chisholm, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was intended to
operate as an implicit limitation upon the jurisdiction of the Article III courts. See
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934); Employees of the
Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v. Missouri, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 1625 (Brennan, J., dissenting); HART & VECHSLER, supra note 5, at 258. On the power of Congress to displace state immunity see Employees of the Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v, Missouri,
supra, at 1616-17.
163. That the doctrine operates only as a procedural bar was recognized in The
Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 155-56, 159 (1868) and in The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15,
21-22 (1869). But see The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1922), The Thekla, 266
U.S. 328, 339-40 (1924), and Justice Marshall's confused concurrence in Employees of
the Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v. Missouri, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 1619 (1973).
164. In discussing the problem of suits against the United States they observe:
Would not clarity and justice be promoted if the Court were to return to Marshall's
position . . . that the only actions against the United States are actions in which
the United States is named as a party defendant or in which the court Is asked to
enter a judgment affecting the title to property admitted or found to belong to the
United States and in its possession, or compelling the expenditure of public funds,
while recognizing that there may be other instances in which the interests of the
United States are so intimately involved that the action cannot in justice proceed
in its absence?
HART & VECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1370. Of course, Congress can consent to suits to
compel the payment of money or the delivery of property. See id. at 1326-38, 1351-56.
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my mind, sovereign immunity should bar only coercive relief. Where
no such relief is sought, I see no reason why it should bar a declaratory
judgment on the legality of any governmental action. Should the public
official ignore the declaration, that is his business; but the court is
under no obligation to avoid declaring what the duty is.1 5 Nor is the
conduct of the official decisive as to whether a suit may be maintained.
Although we are accustomed to filing actions against some named officials seeking a determination with respect to their conduct, it is the
official's authority, not his conduct, that is really at issue. Our thinking
need not be imprisoned by the hoary forms of judicial proceeding. One
can readily imagine a declaratory suit styled "In Re-A Criminal Libel
Statute." Certain individuals would be given notice and permitted to
defend the statute in much the same way that individuals now defend
in rem actions in maritime libel suits.
D.

Primary Conduct

Although the injury need not come from the conduct of an official
charged with enforcing the statute or regulation-as some of the standing, mootness, and ripeness decisions seem to assume-it might still be
argued that at least the challenged rule itself-apart from any threat of
enforcement-must have an appreciable impact on primary conduct.
This seems to be the major premise of the "chilling effect" cases. In
entertaining those suits, the Court focused not on the defendant's conduct, but rather on the impact of the challenged laws on plaintiff's primary conduct. 1 6
The argument that there must be such a clear impact can, of course,
be framed in terms of the substantive constitutional guarantees themselves. It might be argued that absent the minimum complaint of
"injury in fact" no statute could, as a matter of substantive constitutional law, be said to "deprive" any person of liberty or property, or
165. Compare Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 US. 682 (1948), where both
equitable and declaratory relief were requested, with Ex parle Merryman, 17 F. Cas.
144, 153 (No. 9,487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861):
I have exercised all the power which the constitution and laws confer upon me,
but that power has been resisted by a force too strong for me to overcome. It is
possible that the officer who has incurred this grave responsibility may hae misunderstood his instructions, and exceeded the authority intended to be given him;
I shall, therefore, order all the proceedings in this case, with m) opinion, to be
filed and recorded in the circuit court of the United States for the district of
Maryland, and direct the clerk to transmit a copy, under seal, to the president of
the United States. It will then remain for that high officer, in fulfillment of his
constitutional obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" to determine what measures he will take to cause the civil process of the United States
to be respected and enforced.
166. Compare Comment, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HRnV. L.
REv. 844, 853-58 (1970), with Note, The Chilling Effect in ConstitutionalLaw, 69 CoLu.m.
L. REv. 808 (1969).
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"abridge" his freedom of speech. 16 Thus, a municipality does not deprive anyone of the right of free speech by enacting a seditious libel
ordinance where, wholly apart from the ordinance, none of its residents
would dream of criticizing the government; similarly, no one is denied
property without due process by a tax to which he has no objection.
So long as the statute sits on the books unenforced or so long as it does
not inhibit primary conduct, it is not "unconstitutional." This argument has substantial roots in our legal tradition.108 Laird v. Tatum 10
lends it support: There the Court sustained dismissal of plaintiffs' constitutional claims because of their inability to show harm caused by
the challenged governmental conduct. The Court's opinion reveals
the close connection between thinking about "case or controversy" and
substantive constitutional doctrine:"70 Laird concluded that unless
plaintiffs were "presently or prospectively subject to the regulations,
proscriptions or compulsions" of the challenged statutes,1"' there was
no case or controversy. Allegations of a subjective "chill" were not an
adequate substitute for "a claim of specific present objective harm or
72
threat of specific future harm."
Laird is by no means clear, however, and can be read to stand for
several very different propositions: (1) that there was no case or controversy because there were, in fact, no sufficient allegations of a real
"chill"; (2) that any "chill" must have an objective and reasonable
basis; (3) that the "chill" must come from official conduct threatening
harm and not be merely "implied by the existence of the law and regulations"; or (4) that the threat of official harm must be reasonably
"immediate." Laird is, of course, a return to the traditions of Mitchell
and the private tortfeasor model of Ex parte Young and Frothingham.
But it has serious theoretical difficulties if it is taken as holding that,
as a matter of Article III, there must be harm to the complainant which
is linked to "objectively" verifiable official conduct. Even under the
private rights model, all that is necessary is that plaintiffs suffer injury
167. In view of the decisions under the Establishment Clause, it might be conceded
that a state could violate the Establishment Clause even though no one complained of
that fact, and accordingly, the "liberty" and "property" secured by the Due Process
Clause would not be implicated. But see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
256 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
168. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CM. L. Rav. 601, 613 (1968).
169. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
170. Professor Lewis has noted that decisions on standing are often based on the
substantive reach of the constitutional guarantees themselves. Lewis, Constitutional
Rights and the Misuse of "Standing," 14 STAN. L. Rav. 433, 438-39 (1962). Cf. Finley v.
Hampton, 473 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
171. 408 U.S. at 11-13 (1972).
172. Id. at 13-14.
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in fact, and that may be caused by the deterrent effect of the statute
itself.' 7 3
Moreover, it is incorrect to assume that, either as a matter of case or
controversy or of substantive law, there can be no "unconstitutionality"
without some specific injury in fact. To argue, as does Professor Davis,
that some injury must exist, but that "a trifling interest is enough,"1 74
is more than merely exalting form over substance; it ignores the essentially public character of constitutional litigation. Its foundation is the
same as that of the old standing and sovereign immunity doctrinesthe denial that a citizen's interest in governmental regularity is a "real"
one. It is simply far too late for such an argument. The Court's decisions can be viewed as a progression steadily expanding the nature of
an acceptable interest-from traditional private rights of liberty and
property to the "new property," and finally, to the far more diffuse
interests of consumers or users of the environment.
It is thus unsound to contend that there must be an impact on primary conduct before there is a substantive violation of the Constitution. Such an argument confuses remedial with substantive questions.
Absent personal impact, injunctive relief may be inappropriate. But,
so far as Article III and the Fourteenth Amendment are concerned, a
state seditious libel statute can be declared invalid even if there are
no objectors asserting what under the present decisions would be characterized as "injury in fact." The real question is the quality of the
litigant's interest which will be sufficient to justify judicial review.2 75
Similarly, appropriate declaratory relief could be framed for even a
173. Compare Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 US. 136, 152-54 (1967)' and Gardner
v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 17172 (1967), with Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 158, 164 (1967). Some of these cases can be reasonably rationalized as cases of
coerced compliance, i.e., primary conduct is coerced by the reasonable fear that, at some
point, there may be a prosecution. Lake Carriers As'n v. MacMullan, 406 US. 498, 50G.03
(1972). See also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1972). But there are numerous cases
in which jurisdiction was entertained and which were not and probably could not be
so reasoned. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) (no allegation that plaintiff was
deterred from abortion by threat of enforcement of criminal statute); Doe v. Bolton.
93 S. Ct. 739, 745 (1973) (no present threat of enforcement); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342
U.S. 485 (1952); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 287-88 (1936) (no present threat of enforcement). See also
cases and discussion in Comment, Threat of Enforcement-Prerequisite of a Justiciable
Controversy, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 106, 114-16 (1962).
174. K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TL_'r 428-30 (1972).
175. In Abbott Laboratories, Justice Harlan recognized the well.established principle
that "the injunctive and declaratory judgment remedies are discretionary.
387 US.
136, 148 (1967). Accordingly, it may very well be that as a matter of discretion inherent
in the law of remedies, the Court in constitutional cases will ordinarily refuse to consider the validity of a criminal statute absent an immediate threat of enforcement or
some other visible injury in fact. See, e.g., Boyle v. Landry, 401 US. 77 (1971): Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (plurality opinion). See also Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan.
406 US. 583, 588 (1972); Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullen, 406 U.S. 498, 506.08 (1972);
Finley v. Hampton, 473 F.2d 180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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valid statute when in a particular instance its effect is unconstitutional.
A statute requiring a flag salute by soldiers might, for example, be
invalid only in the limited circumstances where a religious objector
complains and where the needs for discipline are not substantial. But
there is no reason why such a declaration could not be obtained by a
citizen rather than by an objecting soldier. The real difficulty would
be the same in either case: the impact on the adjudicative process of
factual gaps in the record.

V. The Special Function Model and Private Rights
The fact that the traditional private rights model is not adequate
to describe the limits of judicial competence in constitutional cases does
not mean that those rights are unimportant.Y0 And the special function model in no way precludes fully effective private remedies. The
crucial problem in current constitutional litigation is the extent to
which the federal courts should grant constitutional determinations in
private suits seeking prospective (injunctive and/or declaratory) relief.
By and large, the present law is unsatisfactory. The Court has entertained suits where substantial private interests were not at stake, and
denied relief where they were. Recent developments indicate a sharp
halt in the former situation. In Boyle v. Landry,17 7 for example, prospective relief was denied where the plaintiffs indiscriminately challenged a number of unlawful assembly statutes without showing that
they had any impact on anyone's primary conduct, let alone that there
was any immediate threat of enforcement. A substantially similar analy.
sis applies to Golden v. Zwickler,178 and Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan,179 although in each, plaintiff's challenge was to a single statute,
176. Professor Jaffe is surely correct in stating that the "central function of the courts
is the determination of the individual's claim to 'just' treatment when the citizen is
demanding his legally prescribed due" with regard to his liberty or property. Jaffe, The
Citizen as Litigant, supra note 23, at 1034.
177. 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
178. 394 U.S. 103 (1969). There, a distributor of anonymous handbills criticizing a1
Congressman's voting record sought a declaratory judgment respecting the constitutionality
of a state statute which penalized the distribution of anonymous literature in connection
with an election campaign. While the case was pending the Congressman received an
appointment to the state judiciary. The Supreme Court concluded that the appeal had
become moot because there was no longer "a substantial controversy between the parties
having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance
of a declaratory judgment." Id. at 108. This was so, said the Court, because "it was
wholly conjectural that another occasion might arise when [plaintiff) might be prosecuted .. . ." Id. at 109. Zwickler is, therefore, a case where there was both an absence
of a threat of enforcement and an absence of any basis for belief that plaintiff again
intended to engage in the conduct described in the complaint. In these circumstances,
the Court concluded that there was no case or controversy.
179. 406 U.S. 538 (1972).
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and to Laird v. Tatum,8 0 where the challenge was to a governmental
practice. Absent a congressional determination that suits in which the
plaintiff does not allege any injury should be entertained by the federal courts, these decisions are consistent with the special function
model. The basis for refusing relief is merely the discretion inherent
in the law of remedies.
To the extent that the special function model requires the explicit
concurrence of the political organs of government, it is arguable that
the time has come, as Justice Rehnquist recently suggested, 18 ' for the
Court to consider narrowing the occasions in which prospective relief
will be granted. That result could be achieved, in the main, by following the lead of Laird v. Tatum, not out of constitutional compulsion,
but rather as a matter of sound equity practice. Prospective relief in
constitutional cases might be denied unless plaintiff satisfied a tightened requirement of injury in fact.' 82 Moreover, limitations of the "on
its face" approach could be developed.1 83 For example, it makes little
sense to me to permit, as would the dissents in California v. LaRue,18 4
a First Amendment overbreadth attack on regulations governing nudity
in barrooms where plaintiff's conduct fell squarely within the concededly valid applications of the regulations. Finally, some consideration might be given to restricting the use of the ever-increasing class
actions in constitutional cases. Retrenchment along some or all of these
lines would, of course, reduce the level of judicial contact with the
political process. tm
At the same time, there should be no invariable requirement of an
immediate threat of enforcement before the court can grant prospective relief.

86

Such relief should be available whenever a substantial

180. 408 U.S. 1, 3, 6 (1972). See also Finley v. Hampton, 473 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
181. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 112-13 n.3 (1972).
182. The "trivialized" interests sufficient to justify judicial review in administratiie
law have not yet become firmly embedded in the area of constitutional law. Tightening
of standing could be accomplished by requiring a clear and substantial nexus between
plaintiff's interest and the substantive constitutional claim. See, e.g., Linda R. S. V.
Richard D. and Texas, 93 S. Ct. 1146 (1973).
183. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-67 (1972), the Court suggested that there would be no further expansion of the "on the face" approach beyond
free speech and race cases. But Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton,
93 S. Ct. 739, 745 (1973) are inconsistent with this result as Justice Rehnquist, the author of Irvis, observes. 93 S. Ct. at 745.
184. 409 US. 109 (1972).
185. Professor Scott has recently examined standing doctrine in terms of its use both
to ration judicial resources and to limit judicial policy-making. 'Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARI. L. REv. 645, 669-92 (1973). Professor
Viner has provided a similar effort in reviewing "ripeness" in functional terns. Viner,
Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 'MIC11.
L. REv. 1443 (1971).
186. But see cases cited in HART & WECUSL.ER, supra note 5, at 133. particularly. International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (195-): United States v. Mitchell,
330 US. 75 (1947).
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showing can be made that the statute or regulation has an appreciable
impact on the plaintiff's primary conduct, wholly apart from whether
the law would in fact be enforced against him. 8 7
Prospective relief should also be available with respect to criminal
statutes: A rational system of justice should not deny a law-abiding
citizen the option of being a plaintiff in a civil suit rather than a defendant in a criminal proceeding.' 88 Prospective relief is particularly
desirable when the criminal statute is said to violate some fundamental
constitutional guarantee such as freedom of speech.' 80 If, for example,
a statute forbidding a certain form of expression is invalid on its face,
a prospective declaration to that effect is a more adequate remedy than
an acquittal in one or more criminal prosecutions brouglt long after
the occasion for the expression has passed. 190
If, however, the prospective criminal defendant seeks to test a statute
valid on its face but possibly unconstitutional as applied to him, the
danger of a frivolous suit increases. Under such circumstances the district courts should be required to entertain prospective suits on a showing that the criminal process is not in fact likely to afford an adequate
vehicle by which to vindicate the asserted constitutional rights, and
that the "as applied" issue can be presented concretely prior to its
actual occurrence.' 0
187. But see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). In Poe there does not seem to have
been an allegation that the doctor was in fact deterred by the statute. The most dif.
ficult case is whether a good faith allegation that the doctor, although not being In
fact deterred, felt acute moral and psychological distress from violating a state statute
would support a case or controversy. That view is, however, inconsistent with the
reasoning of Laird v. Tatum, although in fact plaintiffs made no such showing in
Laird, and it was rejected once again, Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973). See also Finley
v. Hampton, 473 F.2d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1972). But see Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739, 7,15
(1973).

188. The practice of giving declaratory judgments is, in fact, quite widespread, and
it fosters the goal of a rational system of criminal justice. See Note, Declaratory Relief
in Criminal Cases, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1490, 1505-07 (1967).
189. Decisions of the Supreme Court have, until recently, uniformly permitted de-

claratory relief with respect to penal statutes which threatened First Amendment interests.
See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11

(1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
But see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971), and
companion cases.
190. This issue arose in several contexts involving the musical Hair. In each instance
prospective relief on the issue of facial invalidity was granted. Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1972); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
West Palm Beach, 457 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1972); P.B.I.C. Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757
(D. Mass. 1970), appeal pending, No. 71-304, U.S., Oct. Term, 1972. Even more than
movies, plays are "wafting assets." If they are interrupted by arrests or threats of mul.
tiple criminal prosecutions, they will in fact close or not open. Accordingly, producers
will steer wide of controversial issues, and self-censorship will be the inevitable result.
See Doe v. Bolton, 93 S.Ct. 739, 745 (1973) (physician's defense of a criminal proceeding
not adequate to raise constitutional issue).
191. Assume, for example, a facially valid municipal obscenity statute, but the play's
producer, i.e., a prospective defendant, claims that his play is not obscene. Here the
statutory and constitutional questions are identical: If the ordinance is erroneously
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The Court's reluctance to grant prospective relief in such cases almost invariably arises in the context of suits to enjoin pending or
threatened state criminal prosecutions. It might be suggested, as did
Justice Black in Younger v. Harris,9 2 that "Our Federalism" precludes
anticipatory relief in such cases. 19 3 But really the federalist principles
proclaimed in Younger are not constitutionally required or beyond the
power of Congress to alter. Justice Black's federalism simply fails to
account for the radical transformation worked in the federal character
of our government by the Civil War Amendments and the subsequent
expansive grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts.10 ' Our Federalism, circa 1972, means that we have come to recognize that the federal
courts are and should be "the primary and powerful reliance for vindicating every right given by the Constitution."'0 " Similarly, if the
Constitution is viewed as conferring national rights on all citizens,
national courts should be open to vindicate those rights in a uniform,
coherent manner. 96 Federalism considerations cannot be rationalized
in terms of facile distinctions between pending and non-pending proheld to reach a non-obscene play, it is unconstitutional as applied. Once again, it is
simply false to assume generally that the criminal proceeding provides an adequate
remedy for vindication of the constitutional claim. To my mind, therefore, the district
courts should be required to entertain prospective suits upon a showing that in fact
the criminal process is not likely to afford an adequate vehicle in which to vindicate
the constitutional right. Where a defendant is engaging in a "one-shot" transction, criminal prosecution after the fact is probably acceptable, at least where the danger of arrest
during the assertedly protected act is unlikely. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-46,
49, 54 (1971). But, surely, the realities are far different when a play or other course
of continuous conduct is involved. HART WCHSLER, supra note 5, at 1010-11; Monaghan,
supra note 32, at 547-49.
192. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger and its companion cases dealt with pending state
prosecutions. Younger was extended uncritically in Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 713-14 &
n.7, where a physician-defendant in a criminal proceeding was denied intervention in
an otherwise properly maintainable suit for a declaratory judgment, at least where he
was not suing on behalf of a class comprised of all physicians. But see Doe v. Bolton,
93 S. Ct. 739, 745 (1973) (standing of physicians).
193. Note should also be taken of the generally unsuccessful attempts to use removal,
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966), and
preconviction habeas corpus, see discussion in majority and dissenting opinions in
Braden v. 30th Judicial Court of Kentucky, 93 S. Ct. 1123 (1975), as vehicles for b)passing
state criminal proceedings.
194. See Note, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE LT. 1007 (1966). There
is also some dispute whether Justice Black correctly described the 1789 federalism model.
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 1237 n.l.
195. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 (1967), quoting FANKriRim &: LrsDIS, supra
note 6, at 10. See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42 (1972). Cf. L)nch v.
Household Finance Corp., 405 US. 538 (1972), expanding the category of suits maintainable under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
196. The history of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), provides an interesting analogue. Chief Justice Taft justified its retention in terms of the national interests it promoted: the confidence it gave the corporations creating a national market
that they would have access to impartial forums, and often to a special body of substantive law. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURT 79 (2d ed. 1972). Much constitutional litigation, is, of course, really an effort to enforce minimum national rights throughout the
country. See generally Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant, supra note 23.
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ceedings,'9 criminal and civil statutes, 0 s or declaratory and injunctive
prayers. 10 0 The principle must be that the federal courts are the primary vindicators of federal rights, absent some congressional determination to the contrary. If this principle be correct, the abstention doctrine must be thoroughly rethought. 20 0 If the federal courts interpret
"difficult" state law where, as in diversity cases, the federal interest is
marginal at best, it is difficult to see why they should decline that task
where appreciable federal interests hang in the balance.2 01 At the very
least, abstention cases should be rethought in terms of interim relief.
Before it abstains, the federal court should consider whether interim
197. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) modified Dombrowski v. Pfister, 880 U.S.
479 (1965), by holding that a "chilling effect" on First Amendment rights is, by itself,
insufficient to support federal equitable relief, 401 U.S. at 47.54. Younger would, more.
over, apparently require more than the traditional showing of irreparable injury: "[Ce ven
irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is both great and immediate," id.at 43. it is,
as has been noted, not altogether clear that Younger's reasoning can fairly be confined
to pending prosecutions, although arguably special problems are presented where pros.
ecutions are pending. But Justice Black's opinion in Younger purported not to deal
with the issue of nonpending prosecutions, id. at 41, and its negative inferences on that
issue probably did not represent the view of a majority of the Court, as an examination
of all the opinions in Younger and its companion cases will show. In Lake Carriers Ass'n
v. MacMullen, 406 U.S. 490, 509 (1972), the Court described Younger as "having little
force in the absence of a pending state proceeding." Despite the sweeping rhetoric, the
holding of Younger, et al. may, therefore, simply be to limit lower court excesses In
applying Dombrowski's "chillin* effect" doctrine. See generally Note, Implication of the
Younger Cases for the Availability of Federal Equitable Relief When No State Prose.
cution is Pending,72 COLUM. L. REv. 874 (1972).
198. The Court regularly entertains suits where "civil" statutes are involved. Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43-44, recognized that the basis of the criminal.civil distinction
had not been spelled out in the Court's decisions, and the explanation it proffered Is,
to say the least, unilluminating. It is, however, difficult to justify the distinction In
federalism terms, and there are signs that the distinction is coming apart at the seams.
Justice White's dissenting opinion in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 98 (1972) suggests
the applicability of Younger to civil cases. See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 244
(1972) (White, J.,concurring); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), pettilon for cert.
filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1973) (suit to enjoin pending state civil proceedinigs
must satisfy Younger v. Harris). See the confused opinion in Gibson v. Berryhlill, 41
U.S.L.W. 4576, 4580 (U.S. May 7, 1973), and the cryptic order in Joiner v. Dallas, 41
U.S.L.W. 3616 (U.S. May 21, 1973), a case remanding for reconsideration in light, inter ala,
of Younger, a federal court injunction suit against a pending state condemnation
proceeding.
199. It is interesting to note that there is nothing in the language in Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), also an opinion by Justice Black, which even remotely suggests that declaratory as opposed to injunctive relief should not be awarded where there
is no pending state prosecution, but only the threat of one. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct.
705 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739, 745 (1973), would seem to establish beyond
doubt that Younger has no applicability to federal declaratory relief against threatened
state criminal proceedings. Further clarification, however, may be forthcoming front
Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. granted sub noin. Steffel v.
Thompson, 41 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1973). See also Thoms v. Heffernan, 473 F.2d
478, 482-83 (2d Cir. 1973).
200. For a collection of the cases see HART & WECIIsLER, supra note 5, at 985-97. See
also discussion in H. FRIENDLY, supra note 92, at 75-107.
201. See Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullen, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972), emphasizing
that abstention is appropriate "only in narrowly limited 'special circumstances . . .
justifying 'the delay and expense to which application of the abstention doctrine iievitably gives rise." (footnotes omitted); Gibson v. Berryhill, 41 U.S.L.W. 4576, 4581
(U.S. May 7, 1973); Thoms v. Heffernan, 473 F.2d 478, 485-86 (2d Cir. 1973).
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relief could be granted to the plaintiff so that remitting him to the
state court would not substantially eliminate his federal right.
Accordingly, the special function model affords no problem to private interests seeking specific declaratory or injunctive relief. The point
here is that the special function of constitutional adjudication should
not be made to depend on ordinary litigation concerning private rights.

VI.

Conclusion

There is nothing in the "case or controversy" concept, or that of
sovereign immunity, which precludes restructuring our thinking about
the conditions under which constitutional determinations occur. The
discrete doctrines which make up the law of case or controversy are,
with the possible exception of certain aspects of the ripeness and political question doctrines, entirely judiciary-fashioned ordinances of selfdenial rather than constitutionally compelled limitations inhering in
"judicial power." Sovereign immunity places a limitation on the remedies available to the Court, not the Court's competence to pass judgment. What is required is a record sufficiently concrete to give specific
and practical effect to the Court's pronouncements.
To recognize a citizen's stake in a constitutional principle and allow
him access to the Court absent some specific complaint of injury in
fact or effect on primary conduct need not open floodgates to frivolous
constitutional litigation. But it is up to Congress to fashion the boundaries of a model of judicial competence better suited to the Court's
special function.
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